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Abstract
This paper documents multivariate forecast disagreement among professional
forecasters of the Euro area economy and discusses implications for models of het-
erogeneous expectation formation. Disagreement varies over time and is strongly
counter-cyclical. Disagreement is positively correlated with general (economic)
uncertainty. Aggregate supply shocks drive disagreement about the long-run state
of the economy while aggregate demand shocks have an impact on the level of
disagreement about the short-run outlook for the economy. Forecasters disagree
about the structure of the economy and the degree to which individual forecasters
disagree with the average forecast tends to persist over time. This suggests that
models of heterogeneous expectation formation, which are currently not able to
generate those last two features, need to be modified. Introducing learning mech-
anisms and heterogeneous signal-to-noise ratios could reconcile the benchmark
model for disagreement with the observed facts.
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1 Introduction
Given the public availability of macroeconomic data, it is surprising to observe high
degrees of disagreement across agents when it comes to forecasting the future state of
the economy. The degree of forecast disagreement for several macro variables and dif-
ferent countries has been documented by a number of recent papers including Mankiw
et al. (2003), Carroll (2003), Lahiri and Sheng (2008), Banternghansa and McCracken
(2009), Rich and Tracy (2010) Patton and Timmermann (2010), Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2012), Dovern et al. (2012), Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) and Andrade et
al. (2013). However, there are two aspects of forecast disagreement that have largely
been neglected by the existing literature. First, all papers—with the exception of the
study by Banternghansa and McCracken (2009)—ignore the multivariate dimension of
macroeconomic forecast disagreement.1,2 Second, none of the existing papers looks at
the persistence of disagreement of individual forecasters with the prevailing average
predicted state of the economy.
In this paper, I address these two points by analyzing forecast disagreement among
professional business-cycle analysts in the Euro area from a multivariate perspective.
My analysis is relevant for two main reasons. First, a better understanding of the
degree to which agents in the economy disagree about the future—and about factors
that influence disagreement—is of direct interest for economic policy. E.g., one goal
of all major central banks is to anchor inflation expectations at some specific target
value and, thus, ideally they would like to see disagreement about future inflation
rates to disappear. Second, knowledge about the dynamics of overall disagreement
and the persistence of the relative level of individual disagreement helps researchers to
better understand how macroeconomic expectations are formed and how they should
be modelled.
A suitable multivariate approach for measuring disagreement can capture aspects of
disagreement that the conventional (univariate) analyses have neglected. As Banterng-
hansa and McCracken (2009, p.2) write, “it is reasonable to assume that [forecasters]
1Banternghansa and McCracken (2009) analyze the level of multivariate disagreement among mem-
bers of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve Bank and relate the
individual level of disagreement to several characteristics of the members (such as their voting status).
Thus, they look at forecasts made by a very particular type of agents. In addition, the time dimension
of their data set is rather limited so that it does not allow one to analyze, for instance, business-cycle
effects on disagreement.
2In fact, Andrade et al. (2013) build a multivariate model of expectation formation. They do not,
however, use any information about multivariate disagreement to calibrate and evaluate their model.
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construct their vectors of forecasts in a congruent fashion that jointly describes their
view of the economy”. Consequently, when measuring disagreement among forecasters,
they argue, a multivariate perspective is more appropriate than treating disagreement
about the future path of each scalar variable separately. By using an appropriate multi-
variate approach it is also possible to capture disagreement about correlations between
different variables—for instance about the nature of the Phillips curve relationship be-
tween inflation and the unemployment rate. Clearly, empirical evidence on this aspect
would be informative about the appropriateness of the assumption that all agents agree
on the structure of the economy, which is often made in models of disagreement (see,
e.g., Andrade et al., 2013).
To see why it makes sense to take a multivariate perspective for analyzing forecast
disagreement in the context of vector-valued forecasts, a look at the following simple
bivariate example is enlightening. Consider the set of forecasts made for two random
variables X and Y in Figure 1. The black dots are generated from a bivariate normal
distribution with a high positive correlation. This positive correlation reflects the fact
that forecasters, on average, seem to think that higher values of X go along with higher
values of Y . Thus, they tend to agree on the model but disagree on the particular
scenario that will materialize. Now consider the four forecasts indicated by the red
squares. Based on univariate measures of disagreement or multivariate ones that do
not take into account correlations between variables (such as the Euclidean distance)
all of these forecasts imply the same level of disagreement. Given the entire set of
forecasts, however, it is reasonable to argue that an appropriate multivariate measure
of disagreement should indicate a higher level of disagreement for the forecasts in the
lower right and upper left square relative to the level of disagreement associated with
the lower left and the upper right forecast.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Speaking in economic terms, a large general dispersion of forecasts (neglecting cor-
relations) indicates that forecasters disagree strongly about the most likely scenario for
the future state of the economy. While some forecasters could for instance expect a
strong expansion, others could expect more moderate growth or even an outright reces-
sion. Such divergent views about the business-cycle prospects are likely to lead to large
forecast disagreement for most macroeconomic variables. As has been seen, however,
another aspect of disagreement in the multivariate context is that of the correlation
between forecasts. This property of forecasts reflects the degree to which forecasters
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agree or disagree on the model that describes how the economy functions. If forecasts
for two particular variables show a high degree of correlation, forecasters use similar
models to generate their forecasts.3 On the contrary, if those forecasts are uncorrelated,
the forecasters’ views on the proper model for describing the behavior of the two vari-
ables differ greatly, i.e., they disagree about the model of the economy. Both aspects
are relevant for determining the overall level of disagreement.
Different models have been proposed to model forecast disagreement among agents,
i.e., to generate forecast disagreement within one particular model with heterogeneous
expectation formation. In general, these models involve some form of imperfect infor-
mation that has idiosyncratic elements and/or agent-specific beliefs to generate hetero-
geneity across agents. One type of such a model is the noisy-information model of Sims
(2003) and Woodford (2003). In this model, agents receive either noisy signals or are
not able to fully process all the information they receive. Agents then use Bayes’ rule to
optimally update their forecasts. Due to the fact that they receive different signals (or
interpret signals differently), their forecasts can diverge and disagreement among agents
occurs. Andrade et al. (2013) generalizes this setup to allow the imperfectly observed
state of the world to be the sum of a transitory and a permanent component; thereby
they are able to match the empirical fact that forecasters disagree also about the very
long-run outlook. A different type of model is proposed by Lahiri and Sheng (2008)
and Patton and Timmermann (2010) who use heterogeneous prior beliefs to replicate
the fact that agents also disagree about the long-run outlook.4 All of these existing
models share the assumption that agents agree on the structure of the model/economy.
Furthermore, all of the basic models assume that agents are alike5 and they are, thus,
not able to generate persistent differences in the characteristics of individual forecasts.
As I will show in this paper, both of these features are rejected empirically.
3To be more precise, they use models that imply similar linear relationships between the variables.
Theoretically, these could be generated by two or more different (potentially non-linear) structural
models. In addition, it should be stressed that this interpretation rules out the possibility of antici-
pated shocks. (If, for instance, a subgroup of forecasters anticipated an aggregate supply shock when
formulating their multivariate forecasts, these forecasts would imply a different correlation between
growth and inflation then the forecasts made in non-anticipation of such a shock.) I will rule out the
possibility of such anticipated shocks throughout this paper.
4A third type of models that has been proposed to explain disagreement among agents is the
sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002). It has been empirically rejected, however, as
an appropriate model to describe the behavior of professional macro forecasters by Dovern (2013),
Andrade and Le Bihan (2013), and Dovern et al. (2014).
5That means their idiosyncratic signals and/or priors are drawn from the same distributions with-
out any persistence over time.
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The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, I show that
multivariate disagreement is strongly time-varying and that disagreement about the
long-run is usually higher than disagreement about the near future—features that are
consistent with the extended noisy information model of Andrade et al. (2013) or the
models with individual priors about the long-run (Lahiri and Sheng, 2008; Patton and
Timmermann, 2010). Second, I show that disagreement about the correlation between
different variables is very high in general, suggesting that forecasters do not agree on
how the economy works. At the same time, movements in those components do not
explain a large fraction of variation of overall disagreement at the business-cycle fre-
quency, suggesting that the degree to which forecasters disagree about macroeconomic
mechanisms does not vary a lot over different phases of the business cycle. Third,
I show that the relative level of disagreement of individual forecasters displays some
persistence over time.6 Fourth, I show that overall disagreement is increasing in the
level of prevailing macroeconomic uncertainty—a feature that is consistent with exist-
ing models of disagreement (if uncertainty is measured by the signal-to-noise ratio).
Finally, I conclude that the assumption of common knowledge about the true structure
of the model/economy should be abandoned in theoretical models of disagreement7.
Furthermore, future models should allow for persistence in the ranking of relative levels
of individual disagreement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the measures
that I use to estimate the degree of multivariate disagreement. Section 3 discusses the
data set that I use. Section 4 documents the evolution of disagreement over time and
analyzes i) the persistence of levels of individual disagreement, ii) the comovement
of disagreement with different proxies for (macro-)economic uncertainty, and iii) the
reaction of disagreement to different macroeconomic shocks. Section 5 elaborates on
the implications that my empirical results have for the future development of theoretical
models of forecast disagreement. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring Multivariate Disagreement
In this paper, I focus on two different (though related) multivariate measures of forecast
disagreement. The first measures the disagreement of individual forecasters relative to
6In other words, some forecasters tend to persistently publish forecasts that are not in line with
the current average forecast while others tend to persistently publish forecasts which are very similar
to the average forecast. The concept will be formally defined below.
7Andrade et al. (2013) also suggest this feature as a potential future generalization of their model.
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the prevailing average level of disagreement in each period, i.e., this measure indicates
whether a particular forecaster in a particular time period reports a forecast that is
rather similar to the average forecast or very different from what other forecasters are
predicting. The second measure reflects the overall level of disagreement among the
group of forecasters in a particular time period; it measures how dispersed the set of
observed multivariate forecasts is at each point in time and can be used to compare the
prevailing level of disagreement over time.
Banternghansa and McCracken (2009) suggest to use the Mahalanobis distance to
measure relative disagreement for each individual forecasters and to use the determinant
of the cross-sectional sample covariance matrix of the individual vector forecasts as a
measure of overall multivariate disagreement.8 Let yi,t+h|t = [y1i,t+h|t, y
2
i,t+h|t, . . . , y
k
i,t+h|t]
′
denote the forecast vector published by agent i at time t with a forecast horizon of h
periods and denote by y¯t+h|t the average of these forecasts. Given the sample covariance
of the individual forecasts St+h|t = N−1t+h|t
∑Nt+h|t
i=1 (yi,t+h|t − y¯t+h|t)(yi,t+h|t − y¯t+h|t)′ with
Nt+h|t being the number of observed h-step-ahead forecasts at time t, the Mahalanobis
distance for a particular forecaster is given by
di,t+h|t =
√
(yi,t+h|t − y¯t+h|t)′S−1t+h|t(yi,t+h|t − y¯t+h|t). (1)
One property of this measure is that it rescales the absolute level of disagreement sepa-
rately for each time period and forecast horizon (through the normalization by S−1t+h|t).
Thereby, it provides a measurement of relative disagreement of a particular forecaster
(compared to the average level of disagreement that is prevailing in a particular time
period). It allows to rank forecasters according to their corresponding degrees of dis-
agreement with the prevailing average forecast.
A measure of the overall level of disagreement prevailing at time t with respect to
forecasts with a horizon of h is given by the square root of the determinant of St+h|t:
Dt+h|t =
√
det(St+h|t) (2)
This measure is increasing in the cross-sectional variances for each particular scalar
forecast, i.e., the elements on the main diagonal of St+h|t and decreasing in the ab-
solute value of each of the cross-sectional correlations between any pair of two scalar
8In some text passages, I use the term overall disagreement as a synonym for multivariate dis-
agreement.
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forecasts, i.e., the off-diagonal elements of St+h|t.9 It measures the absolute level of
multivariate disagreement and, thus, is useful for comparisons across time and across
different forecast horizons.
3 Data
I use data on forecasts made by professional business-cycle analysts from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters (SPF) that has been published at a quarterly frequency by
the European Central Bank (ECB) since the first quarter of 1999. The data set covers
forecasts from a wide range of professional forecasters—mostly from research institutes
and financial institutions. The panel ist so homogeneous, though, that it is unlikely
that major differences in incentive or market structures trivially explain much of the
disagreement across forecasters.10 The data set contains forecasts for the growth rate
of real gross domestic product (gt), the inflation rate (pit), and the unemployment rate
(ut), i.e., throughout the paper k = 3 and yi,t+h|t = [gi,t+h|t, pii,t+h|t, ui,t+h|t]′. The SPF
data include information about forecasts of different types (fixed-event as well as fixed-
horizon forecasts) and with various forecast horizons. In this paper, I concentrate on
the fixed-horizon forecasts with the shortest forecast horizon available (1-year-ahead
forecasts, h = 4) and those with the longest forecast horizon available (5-years-ahead
forecasts, h = 20).11
The sample covers the forecast periods from 1999q1 to 2014q2. Given the focus of
this paper, I consider only such observations for which forecasts for all three variables are
provided by a particular forecaster. The panel ist unbalanced because some forecasters
left the survey at some point in time and others entered after the start of the SPF in
1999; in addition, forecasters are not required to respond for each wave of the survey.
The average number of long-term forecasts observed at each point in time is 34.7 and
9A theoretical drawback of this measure—which, however, is unlikely to become relevant in
practice—is the fact that it approaches its minimum 0 if only one of the elements on the main-diagonal
of St+h|t approaches zero and also if only one of the correlations implied by the off-diagonal elements
approaches 1.
10A list of participating institutions can be found on the ECB website (http://www.ecb.europa.
eu/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/index.en.html).
11Strictly speaking, the 5-years-ahead forecasts are fixed-event forecasts made for the annual average
of the forecast variables in a particular target year. This target year is changing in such a way that
the forecast horizon varies between 21 and 18 quarters. Given the very long forecast horizon it is
reasonable to expect that forecasters use their estimates for the unconditional mean of each variable
as their forecasts; in this case the forecasts are likely to be unaffected by changes of the target year or
small variations of the forecast horizon.
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the average number of short-term forecasts is 40.8 (Table 1). The volatility of the
number of observations across time is rather moderate, but the number of available
forecasts tends to decline towards the end of the sample.12
[Table 1 about here.]
4 Multivariate Disagreement about the Euro Area Outlook
4.1 Disagreement over Time
In this section, I document the evolution of multivariate disagreement about the fu-
ture state of the economy in the Euro area among participants of the SPF over time.
This assessment is based on the measure defined by equation 2. Figure 2 shows the
time series of multivariate disagreement for both forecast horizons. Two main features
are visible from the graph. First, disagreement seems to intensify during recessions
(2001/02; 2008/09; 2011/12). Second, the level of disagreement about the state of the
economy in the very long-run (black line) is usually higher than that about economic
conditions in the nearer future (red line)—except during some of the recessionary pe-
riods. Interestingly, the higher level of disagreement about the state of the economy in
the long-run is caused by higher disagreement about the long-run unemployment rate
and higher disagreement about the correlations between the three variables in the long-
run.13 Disagreement about the long-run inflation rate and the long-run growth rate is,
on average, lower than that about the nearer term movements of those variables.
[Figure 2 about here.]
What elements of St+h|t are driving most of the fluctuations in multivariate disagree-
ments over time? Is it variations in the level of disagreement about future business-cycle
scenarios (elements on the main diagonal)? Or is it time-variation in the level of dis-
agreement about the appropriate model of the economy (correlations on the off-diagonal
elements)? Figure 3 shows the time series of each of the elements in St+h|t for both
forecast horizons. It is evident that medium-to-low-frequency movements in multivari-
ate disagreement are driven primarily by movements in the cross-sectional standard
12In 1999 the survey started with an average number of respondents (reporting short-term forecasts)
of 46.5; in 2013 on average only 33.5 forecasters submitted forecasts for all three variables.
13The higher disagreement about the correlations between variables is reflected in lower cross-
sectional correlations between pairs of long-run forecast relative to correlations based on short-run
forecasts.
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deviation for each of the three variables while fluctuations of the implied bivariate cor-
relations are of higher frequency. The impression is confirmed by a regression of Dt+h|t
on the three standard deviations in one case and on the three correlations in the other
case. For the short-term forecasts the univariate standard deviations alone explain 85%
of the variation of Dt+4|t while the correlations alone explain only 8% of that variation.
For the long-term forecasts the univariate standard deviations alone explain even 95%
of the variation of Dt+20|t while the share of variation explained by the correlations
alone is up to 22%. Thus, in general variation in the level of disagreement about the
right model does not seem to be very important for movements in overall disagreement
among forecasters.
[Figure 3 about here.]
But what about the unconditional level of (dis-)agreement about the relationship
between the three macroeconomic variables? In general disagreement is quite high,
i.e., the observed cross-sectional correlations are relatively small (in absolute values).
Table 2 shows the full-sample averages. All correlations have the expected sign. The
cross-section of forecasts on average reflect a Phillips curve relationship in the sense
that higher growth forecasts tend to go along with higher forecasts for inflation. The
correlation is stronger for the short-term forecasts (.16) than for the long-term forecasts
(.10). This comes also to no surprise since long-term growth forecasts are likely to
reflect assessments of the potential growth rate of the economy which in itself should
not affect inflation in the long-run. The implied Phillips curve relationship in terms
of an inflation-unemployment trade-off is less pronounced but has the expected sign.
The belief of forecasters in the Phillips curve has been documented also for instance by
Fendel et al. (2011). Forecasters seem to agree most on the relationship between growth
and the unemployment rate (Okun’s law). The average observed correlation based on
short-term forecasts is -0.25—and even for long-term forecasts it is -0.17. This finding is
in line with evidence reported by for instance Frenkel et al. (2011) or Ball et al. (2014).
[Table 2 about here.]
How did overall disagreement evolve following the Great Recession? Anecdotal evi-
dence suggest that no consensus about the causes and implications of the sharp decline
in economic activity in the Euro area has yet emerged. To formally check whether
there have been significant shifts in multivariate disagreement after the beginning of
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the Great Recession and to analyze which of the components have been driving these
shifts, I regress Dt+h|t or its components respectively on a constant and two dummy
variables. The first dummy variable (Crisis) captures shifts that are limited to the pe-
riod between 2008q3 and 2010q2. The second dummy variable (Post2008q3) captures
permanent (or at least very persistent) shifts that have occurred after the beginning of
the Great Recession.
Signs of an increase in disagreement among the participants of the SPF after 2008
could be twofold. First, forecasters could potentially disagree more on the future sce-
nario that is most likely for the economy while in general agreeing or disagreeing to
the same extent about the functioning/structure of the economy. Second, forecasters
could potentially disagree more about how the economy works—how growth, inflation
and the unemployment rate move together—than before the crisis.
First, the results show that multivariate disagreement about the near future in-
creased substantially and significantly during the Great Recession but decreased back
to moderate levels after 2010, which are not significantly higher than those before the
crisis (Table 3). Second, multivariate disagreement about the long-term outlook for the
Euro area has nearly doubled after 2008 compared to the period before the crisis. Third,
the results show that changes in disagreement about the co-movement of variables are
not the main drivers of overall disagreement. Only three of the relevant twelve coef-
ficients are significantly different from zero: Disagreement about the co-movement of
inflation and the unemployment rate in the short-run temporarily decreased during the
Great Recession as did disagreement about the co-movement of growth and inflation
in the long-run. Surprisingly, disagreement about the co-movement of growth and the
unemployment rate in the long-run decreased during the Great Recession. Comparing
the entire post-2008 period to the period before the Great Recessions reveals no signif-
icant changes in the level of disagreement about the relationship between the variables
at all.
[Table 3 about here.]
Finally, while disagreement about future growth rates temporarily increased during
the Great Recession, most of the permanent increase in overall disagreement (both for
the short-term and the long-term outlook) is due to an increased dispersion of forecasts
for inflation and the unemployment rate. The permanent increase is about 1/3 for both
variables and for both forecast horizons. Overall, the observed increased in disagreement
seems to be mainly due to an increased uncertainty about the business-cycle scenarios
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which are going to materialize rather than due to an increased divergence of opinions
about the functioning of the economy.
4.2 Persistence of Levels of Individual Disagreement
Turning to the persistence of the level of relative individual disagreement, it is of interest
to re-state what has been found with respect to the persistence of rankings of other
moments of the forecast distribution. A high degree of persistence in the ranking of
forecasters has been documented with respect to the level of point forecasts (Batchelor,
2007; Patton and Timmermann, 2010; Boero et al., 2014) and with respect to the level
of subjectively perceived forecast uncertainty (Bruine De Bruin et al., 2011; Boero et
al., 2014). Both observations are in contrast to the prediction of all models that have
been proposed to model disagreement and that were discussed in the introduction to this
paper. To improve the foundation for these models it is also of interest to document the
degree of persistence in the ranking of forecasters with respect to the individual level
of disagreement. The currently used models of heterogeneous expectation formation
imply a low degree of such persistence.
As a first inspection of the data consider Figure 4. The blue dots refer to observations
corresponding to those 10 forecasters that have the highest average rank in terms of
disagreement over the entire sample.14 The red dots refer to observations corresponding
to those 10 forecasters that have the lowest average rank in terms of disagreement
over the entire sample. Both plots (for long- and short-term forecasts) suggest that
there is substantial persistence in the forecasters’ relative level of disagreement. The
disagreement rankings look less persistent, however, than most rankings analyzed in
the papers cited in the previous paragraph. The plots also indicate an asymmetry in
the sense that those forecasters that disagree only very little on average do so very
persistently whereas the relative level of disagreement of those forecasters that disagree
a lot on average is more volatile.
[Figure 4 about here.]
A measure to formally analyze the persistence of rankings over time is the so-called
Kendall coefficient of concordance (Kendall, 1948). It measures the ratio of the sum
of squared mean deviations of the observed average ranks (computed across time) to
14These “extreme” forecasters are selected among the subset of forecasts for which at least 12
observations are available.
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the maximum possible value. The statistic, 0 ≤ W ≤ 1, is equal to 0 if the rankings
change randomly over time—and consequently all forecasters have the same average
rank—and it is equal to 1 if the ranking is perfectly stable over time.15
Table 4 shows the Kendall coefficient of concordance of the rankings of the individual
levels of disagreement, di,t+h|t, for the two forecast horizons and different samples.16
The first line corresponds to the full-sample statistic while the lower lines correspond
to the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods respectively. The persistence of this ranking is
generally higher in case of the long-term forecasts (.2 based on the full sample) than in
case of the short-term forecasts (.14). Thus, there is a stronger tendency in case of long-
term forecasts that some forecasters tend to deviate always a lot from the consensus
outlook on the future state of the economy while others tend to closely agree to this
average view most of the time. A second observation is that since the beginning of
the Great Recession the persistence of the ranking based on disagreement about the
short-run outlook has increased substantially relative to the time period before 2008.
The measure of concordance increased from .16 to .25.17
[Table 4 about here.]
In general, the persistence of the relative level of disagreement across forecasters is
lower, however, than the persistence of relative levels of point forecasts or the persistence
of reported forecast uncertainty as found by Boero et al. (2014) based on a similar data
set from Great Britain. They report Kendall coefficients of concordance of roughly .4
(forecast uncertainty) and between .2 and .5 (point forecasts). Based on the data used
in this paper I obtain similar results: The persistence of relative forecast uncertainty
over time is much higher for both forecast horizons (.3 to .65) and for long-term point
forecasts (.27 to .44). For short-term point forecasts (.13 to .19) it is roughly the same
as found for the disagreement ranking.
15Under the null hypothesis of randomly changing rankings over time and the assumption of no
missing data the random variable (T − 1)N W (where T denotes the number of time periods and N
is the (fix) number of ranked individuals/items) approximately follows a χ2 distribution with T − 1
degrees of freedom.
16In contrast to the assumption usually made for the computation of Kendall’s coefficient of con-
cordance, the panel data used in this study is subject to missing values. I tackle this problem in two
steps. First, I only consider those forecasters in the computation of relative rankings with at least 12
reported forecasts. Second, I use the adjusted procedure to compute W which is used by Boero et al.
(2014).
17Note that a smaller value of Kendalls coefficient of concordance for the full-sample compared to
the measure for any of the sub-samples is perfectly fine: A ranking could be perfectly stable over two
different sub-samples (W = 1) while every individual has the same average rank over the full sample
(W = 0).
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4.3 Disagreement and Uncertainty
Disagreement among agents is usually considered to be one component of aggregate
forecast uncertainty (see, e.g., Giordani and So¨derlind (2003), Lahiri and Sheng (2010)
or Bachmann et al. (2013)). However, it is also appealing to think of disagreement as
a function of aggregate uncertainty. If, for instance, higher macroeconomic uncertainty
lowers the signal-to-noise ratio, forecast disagreement among agents will rise (Coibion
and Gorodnichenko, 2012). Dovern et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence based on
survey data from all G7 countries that disagreement among professional forecasters is
increasing in the conditional volatility of the forecast variable. So far however, the link
between uncertainty and disagreement has been analyzed in the univariate context only.
I use a simple regression framework to analyze the correlation between multivariate
disagreement and different measures of general (economic) uncertainty. The model is
of the following form
Dt+h|t = α + βDt−1+h|t−1 + γ′Ut + εt+h|t, (3)
where the lagged value of multivariate disagreement is included to capture persistence in
the absolute level of disagreement among forecasters, Ut contains one or more proxies of
general (economic) uncertainty, and εt+h|t is an iid error term. I use four different mea-
sures of uncertainty: The policy uncertainty index provided by Baker et al. (2014), the
realized volatility of equity markets (based on the EuroStoxx50), the realized volatility
of oil prices, and the realized volatility of the exchange rate of the Euro against the US-
Dollar. Initially, I use each of these measures in separate regressions. All uncertainty
indicators are pooled into one regression in the fifth model for each forecast horizon.
The results are given in Table 5.
The regression results show that disagreement about the future state of the economy
is quite persistent. The coefficients corresponding to the lagged values of disagreement
are highly significant and also relatively large. They are larger for short-term disagree-
ment (about .5) relative to the case based on long-term forecasts (about .2 to .3).
Looking at the correlation between the uncertainty proxies and my measure of multi-
variate disagreement reveals two interesting results. First, in most of the regressions
that include only one measure of uncertainty the relevant coefficients are highly signif-
icant indicating a positive correlation between overall disagreement about the future
state of the economy and the used measures. Second, the indicator for policy uncer-
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tainty is the only proxy that shows no significant correlation with Dt+4|t while it is
the only proxy that remains significant when all proxies are included in the regression
with Dt+20|t as the dependent variable. This shows that uncertainty about the direction
of (economic) policy is not relevant for the level of disagreement about the short-run
outlook for the economy. Furthermore, this shows that policy uncertainty is the main
driver of disagreement about the long-run prospects for the economy.18 Overall, my
results suggest that a sizable fraction of variation in multivariate disagreement can be
explained by movements in (economic) uncertainty.
[Table 5 about here.]
4.4 Excursion: Reaction to Structural Shocks
In the previous sections I have documented that multivariate disagreement among fore-
casters is strongly time-varying and correlated for instance with certain measures of
economic uncertainty. Even though existing models of disagreement contain no clear
notion of different macroeconomic shocks (such as aggregate supply or demand shocks),
it is, eventually, interesting to know which structural shocks drive movements in dis-
agreement among forecasters.19 Given clear results, disagreement among forecasters
could, for instance, be used as an observable indicator that might help to identify cer-
tain unobservable structural shocks in real-time. To analyze this aspect I resort to a
small-scale standard macroeconomic vectorautoregressive model (VAR).
The VAR is used to model a vector of quarterly measured variables, which is given
by xt = [gdpt, cpit, it, Dt+h|t]′, where Dt+h|t is given by equation 2 with either h = 4 or
h = 20, gdpt is the log of real gross domestic product, cpit is the log of the (seasonally
adjusted) consumer price index, and it is main monetary policy interest rate set by the
ECB. The reduced form VAR is given by
A(L)xt = ut, (4)
where A(L) = I − A1L− A2L2 − . . .− ApLp is a log polynomial of order p and ut is a
vector of iid error terms with zero mean and a fix variance-covariance matrix Σu. The
18I believe it is reasonable to assume that the index by Baker et al. (2014), which is based on an
aggregation of news paper articles, is exogenous to my measure of disagreement extracted from the
SPF. Therefore, a causal interpretation is valid at this point.
19Andrade et al. (2013) suggest to embed models of disagreement in a general equilibrium setup.
In such a richer model it would be possible to test the model’s predictions about the reaction of
disagreement to different structural shocks.
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optimal lag order is determined based on the Akaike information criterion and found
to be p = 2.
To identify a structural VAR underlying the observed reduced-form representation
several additional restrictions have to be made. I follow much of the standard macro
literature and use the sign-restrictions approach proposed by Uhlig (2005) and Mount-
ford and Uhlig (2009). With this approach identification is achieved by restricting the
sign of the response of certain variables to a specific structural shock. Importantly, the
sign of the response of the variable(s) of particular interest is left unrestricted a priory
and is fully determined by the data. I identify an aggregate supply shock, an aggregate
demand shock and a monetary policy shock. It is important to choose the imposed
sign-restrictions in such a way that the different shocks are clearly identified. I do this
by assuming that following an adverse aggregate supply shock gdpt goes down and cpit
as well as it go up, following an adverse aggregate demand shock gdpt, cpit and it go
down, and following a contractionary monetary policy shock it increases and gdpt as
well as cpit go down. These restrictions are imposed for the period of the shock and
the following period, thus for two periods in total.20
The impulse response figures (IRFs) for both measures of multivariate disagreement
(based on short-term and based on long-term forecasts) to the three different shocks
are shown in Figure 5.21 Two observations are noteworthy. First, the impact of each of
the structural shocks tends to be larger on disagreement about the short-run outlook
for the state of the economy relative to disagreement about the long-run prospects.
Second, the only statistically significant responses (on a 90% confidence level) are those
of short-term disagreement on aggregate demand shocks and of long-term disagreement
on aggregate supply shocks. In other words: A negative demand shock leads to a
significant (short-lived) increase in disagreement among forecasters about the state
of the economy one year ahead, while an adverse aggregate supply shock leads to a
significant (and persistent) rise in disagreement among forecasters about the state of
the economy five years ahead. This seems plausible given that supply-side factors are
most important for the long-term development of an economy while demand-side factors
are more relevant for determining the state of the business-cycle in the short-run.
20Results are qualitatively robust against varying this choice within a sensible range.
21I use the “pure” sign-restriction approach from Uhlig (2005). I draw up to 4.000 draws from the
posterior of the parameters of the reduced-form VAR model. For each of these draws I simulate 100
potential impulse vectors. All impulse response functions are based on 4.000 draws that fulfill the
requirements of the imposed sign-restrictions.
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[Figure 5 about here.]
5 Implications for Models of Disagreement
Some of the stylized facts, which are documented in the previous sections, are not
explained by existing models of forecast disagreement. Notably, I am referring to the
persistence of forecasters’ individual levels of relative disagreement and the low level
of agreement on the basic structure of the economy. This suggests that future models
should include additional features to provide a more realistic description of the process
of heterogeneous expectation formation.
To explain in more detail how and why the observed data are at odds with the
predictions of the current theoretical models, I first take a closer look at the model
proposed by Andrade et al. (2013) as their model offers a multivariate framework to
organize thoughts. This model of expectation formation assumes that the true data
generating process for yt = [y
1
t , y
2
t , . . . , y
k
t ]
′ is of the following form
yt = (Ik − Φ)µt + Φyt−1 + νyt , (5)
µt = µt−1 + ν
µ
t , (6)
with initial conditions y0 and µ0. Andrade et al. (2013) assume furthermore that
all eigenvalues of Φ are inside the unit circle and that the two error terms are i.i.d.
Gaussian innovations with covariance matrices Σy and Σµ. Forecasters observe polluted
idiosyncratic signals which are given by
yit = yt + ηit, (7)
where ηt are i.i.d. Gaussian innovations with covariance matrix Σ
η. Forecasters then
use the current and past values of yit to construct optimal h-steps-ahead forecasts
E[yt+h|yit, yi(t−1), . . . , y10] using the Kalman filter.22 Forecast disagreement occurs be-
cause forecasters are informationally constrained in the sense that they, first, do not
perfectly observe the current true state of the economy and that they, second, have
to infer what changes are due to transitory shocks (νyt ) and what changes are due to
permanent shocks (νµt ).
22Details are given by equations 3.6-3.9 in Andrade et al. (2013).
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The model is able to account for three features of forecast disagreement: i) dis-
agreement is observed for all forecast horizons, ii) the shape of the term structure of
disagreement may differ across different variables,23 and iii) forecast disagreement is
time-varying for all forecast horizons. The model fails, however, to generate predictions
that are in line with the two additional stylized facts that have been documented in
this paper: persistence in the ranking of relative individual disagreement and stark
disagreement about the interaction of different variables.
Given the baseline parameter calibration from Andrade et al. (2013), simulating
their model yields cross-sectional forecast correlations (implied by the off diagonal ele-
ments of St+h|t) that lie in the range of .32 to .89 in absolute values. This is much higher
than the observed values which were documented in Table 2. At the same time, when
the simulated cross-sections of vector-forecasts are used to rank forecasters according
to their individual level of relative disagreement for each time period, then Kendall’s
coefficient of concordance is, not surprisingly, close to 0. This is significantly lower than
the observed value. In what follows I suggest ways to modify the model, which would
enable it to account for these facts.
The first contradiction could be resolved either by increasing the variance of the
noise component or by relaxing the assumption that all agents know the true structure
of the model. The first solution seems not very attractive as it would increase the
volatility of forecasts above the observed level and would lead to unrealistic signal-to-
noise ratios.24 The second solution could be implemented by introducing some kind
of learning algorithm that agents use to infer the structure of the model based on the
history of (polluted) data that they observe. This additional source of heterogeneity
across agents would introduce more disagreement about the structure of dependence
between different variables.
The second contradiction could be resolved by introducing heterogeneous signal-to-
noise ratios that are agent-specific and fixed over time.25 In this case, forecasters with
23I do not discuss this issue in this paper because the term structure does not differ much across the
three variables available in the SPF data set. Andrade et al. (2013) document that the term structure
looks remarkable different for disagreement about future interest rates. This can be explained by
the fact that interest rates, in contrast to most other macroeconomic variables, are observed without
measurement error.
24It could even be argued that the signal-to-noise ratios implied by the baseline calibration of
Andrade et al. (2013) are already too low. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), for instance, report
estimated signal-to-noise rations that are much higher.
25Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) analyze this feature as an extension of their model. They
reject it empirically based on indirect evidence that disagreement does not respond to shocks.
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low signal-to-noise ratios would tend to deviate strongly from the average forecast, i.e.,
they would have persistently high levels of relative disagreement, while forecasters with
high signal-to-noise ratios would tend to publish forecasts very similar to the average
forecast, i.e., they would have persistently low levels of relative disagreement. A slight
modification of the simulation of the model of Andrade et al. (2013) demonstrates
this point: Instead of using a fixed Ση for all forecasters I multiply the Ση from their
baseline calibration by a forecaster-specific factor, which is drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution with a lower bound of .1 and an upper bound of 2. Simulating
this modified model yields a coefficient of concordance for the sequence of rankings of
relative disagreement of about .2, which is much closer to the values that are implied
by the SPF data. Given that differences in the signal-to-noise ratio—which could
reflect differences in the availability of private information, in the quality of the forecast
production process, or different ways to process public signals—are very likely to exist
in reality, this seems to be a plausible feature that could be added in a straightforward
manner.
The alternative type of model as suggested by Lahiri and Sheng (2008) or Patton
and Timmermann (2010) has been proposed to model sequences of fixed-event forecasts.
The prior about the long-run outlook is re-drawn from a particular distribution for each
of these events (normally annual growth rates). Lahiri and Sheng (2008) assume, for
instance, that each January every forecaster forms some prior about the annual growth
rate in the next calendar year. They do not suggest any dependence between the
draws for two consecutive years. This would, however, be necessary to generate a cer-
tain degree of persistence in the ranking of levels of individual relative disagreement.
In the context of fixed-horizon forecasts, one possibility (following Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2012)) is to make the ad-hoc assumption that forecasters build their forecasts
as a weighted average of the optimal model-consistent forecast and some agent-specific
prior, which is assumed to be fixed over time. The weights given to the prior at different
forecast horizons could be calibrated to match the observed persistence of the ranking.
Such a model could also generate the observed persistence of the ranking when forecast-
ers are ranked according to their point predictions. This approach seems, however, not
very attractive since forecasts are formed in an ad-hoc way and since the assumption
of a strictly fixed long-run prior appears overly strict.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the behavior of disagreement among professional forecasters of the
economy in the Euro area over the period from 1999 to 2014. It is the first documen-
tation of disagreement among professional forecasters from a multivariate perspective.
I have used measures proposed by Banternghansa and McCracken (2009) that take
into account both dispersion of univariate forecasts as well as disagreement about the
co-movement of variables.
I have documented various stylized facts of multivariate disagreement and I have
discussed what implications they have for the theoretical modelling of heterogeneous
expectation formation.
I have shown that overall disagreement fluctuates substantially over time. These
fluctuations are mainly driven by changes of disagreement about the future of individ-
ual variables rather than changes in the extent to which forecasters agree or disagree
about the expected correlation between the different variables. In that sense, it is the
volatility of disagreement about scenarios rather than variations of the degree of dis-
agreement about the structure of the economy that is driving movements of multivariate
disagreement. However, looking at the unconditional level of multivariate disagreement
reveals that disagreement about the structure of the economy contributes substantially
to overall disagreement.
Furthermore, I have shown that there is some degree of rank persistence over time
when forecasters are ranked according to their individual level of relative disagreement.
My results indicate also that variations of overall disagreement are driven by economic
uncertainty. More precisely, policy uncertainty affects disagreement about the long-run
outlook while proxies that measure uncertainty on financial markets are more closely
related to disagreement about the economic situation in the short-run. Finally, I have
shown that disagreement about the long-run is affected persistently and significantly by
aggregate supply shocks while disagreement about the near future is temporarily and
significantly affected by aggregate demand shocks.
The last part of the paper shows that existing models of forecast disagreement, by
construction, do not capture important aspects of heterogeneity across forecasters. In
particular they do not allow for much disagreement about the structure of the economy
and predict no persistence in the level of individual relative disagreement. A promising
approach to reconcile theoretical models of heterogeneous expectation formation and
these documented stylized facts about disagreement seems to be a modified version of
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the model by Andrade et al. (2013), in which forecasters face different signal-to-noise
ratios (to generate both consensus-oriented and disagreeing types of forecasters) and
have to learn about the parameters of the model (to generate less agreement about the
structure of the economy). Using information about multivariate aspects of disagree-
ment can be beneficial for the calibration of such models.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for SPF Data
Growth (g) Inflation (pi) Unempl. (u)
h = 4 h = 20 h = 4 h = 20 h = 4 h = 20
N 2447 1874 2447 1874 2447 1874
N/T 40.78 34.70 40.78 34.70 40.78 34.70
SD(N/T) 5.52 4.00 5.52 4.00 5.52 4.00
Average 1.56 2.04 1.75 1.90 9.12 8.03
SD 1.06 0.37 0.37 0.24 1.37 1.08
Notes: N denotes the total number of observations; N/T is the average number of observations per
survey wave; SD(N/T) is the standard deviation over time of this average number of observations;
Average denotes the average value of the point forecasts; SD denotes the standard deviation of point
forecasts (across individuals and time).
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Table 2: Average Values of Elements of St+h|t
h = 4 h = 20
sd(g) 0.36 0.27
sd(pi) 0.27 0.22
sd(u) 0.31 0.65
Corr(g, pi) 0.16 0.10
Corr(g, u) −0.25 −0.17
Corr(pi, u) −0.10 −0.02
Notes: The values shown are based on
the averages for each element of St+h|t
over the full sample. These averages
are computed as s¯ij,h =
∑T
t=1 s
ij
t+h|t,
where sij
t+h|t denotes the element of
St+h|t corresponding to the ith row
and the jth column. sd(•) is computed
as the square root of the main diago-
nal elements. Corr(•, •) is computed
as the correlations that correspond to
the off-diagonal elements.
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Table 3: Changes in Multivariate Disagreement after the Great Recession
Short-Term (h = 4)
Dt+4|t sd(g) sd(pi) sd(u) Corr(g, pi) Corr(g, u) Corr(pi, u)
Crisis 0.078∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.044 0.110 0.167∗∗
(0.019) (0.060) (0.027) (0.037) (0.074) (0.085) (0.073)
Post 2008q3 0.015 0.066 0.047∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.081 −0.034
(0.013) (0.042) (0.019) (0.026) (0.052) (0.060) (0.052)
Constant 0.020∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.022) (0.010) (0.014) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027)
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
R2 0.35 0.30 0.41 0.38 0.01 0.04 0.09
Long-Term (h = 20)
Dt+20|t sd(g) sd(pi) sd(u) Corr(g, pi) Corr(g, u) Corr(pi, u)
Crisis −0.000 0.043∗ −0.035 −0.057 0.134∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.086
(0.010) (0.022) (0.026) (0.065) (0.073) (0.077) (0.074)
Post 2008q3 0.024∗∗∗ 0.003 0.063∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.056 −0.071
(0.007) (0.016) (0.019) (0.047) (0.053) (0.056) (0.053)
Constant 0.030∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029)
N 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
R2 0.21 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.07 0.09 0.04
Notes: Dt+h|t is the measure for multivariate disagreement given by equation 2. sd(•) refers to the cross-sectional standard
deviation for a particular type of univariate forecast. Corr(•, •) refers to the cross-sectional correlation of a particular pair
of univariate forecasts. Crisis is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the periods from 2008q3 to 2010q2 and 0 otherwise.
Post2008q3 is a dummy variable that is 1 since 2008q3 and 0 for all periods before. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance of coefficients on the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level.
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Table 4: Persistence of Ranking With Respect to Level of Disagreement
h = 4 h = 20
Full sample 0.14 0.20
Before 2008q3 0.16 0.31
Since 2008q3 0.25 0.32
For comparison (full sample):
Point forecasts
g .13 .30
pi .19 .44
u .14 .27
Forecast uncertainty
g .56 .65
pi .32 .62
u .54 .56
Notes: The table shows values of
Kendall’s coefficient of concordance. The
statistics have been calculated by account-
ing for missing values as proposed in Boero
et al. (2014).
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Figure 1: Intuitive Argument for Using Multivariate Disagreement
Y
X
Notes: Data for the black dots were generated using a bivariate standard normal distribution with a
correlation coefficient of 0.9. The figure illustrates that univariate measures of disagreement or
multivariate measures that do not take correlations between variables into account (such as the
Euclidean distance) miss important aspects when variables are correlated.
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Figure 2: Multivariate Disagreement among SPF Participants
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Notes: Estimates are computed using equation 2.
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Figure 3: Elements of Multivariate Disagreement
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Notes: The left plots show the square roots of the elements from the main-diagonal of St+h|t as a
univariate measure of disagreement about the future paths of each individual variable of yt. The
right plots show the cross-sectional correlations implied by St+h|t for the three possible bivariate
combinations of the variables in yt.
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Figure 4: Persistence of Individual Levels of Disagreement
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Notes: Individual level of disagreement computed as in equation 1 is measured on the vertical axis.
The blue dots refer to observations corresponding to those 10 forecasters that have the highest
average rank in terms of disagreement over the entire sample. The red dots refer to observations
corresponding to those 10 forecasters that have the lowest average rank in terms of disagreement over
the entire sample. The small grey dots refer to all other observations. The black line represents the
average level of disagreement at each point in time and has been added to demonstrate that di,t+h|t
is a normalized measure.
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Figure 5: Reaction of Disagreement to Structural Shocks
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Notes: The upper plots show the impulse response functions of Dt+4|t based on a VAR given by
equation 4. The lower plots show the distribution of IRFs of Dt+20|t based on a VAR given by
equation 4. The black lines represent the median response while the dark (light) blue bands represent
66% (90%) confidence bands based on 4.000 simulated IRFs.
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